

The Politics of Chinese Intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918-1922)
Direct Military Involvement, Its Diplomatic Intention, and the Projection of An International Image

Zhengmao Sheng

Abstract

During the Russian Civil War (1917-1922), the Republic of China, under its Beiyang Government, traditionally regarded as weak and decentralized, also sent troops to participate in the Allied intervention in Siberia. This paper analyzes the specific operations of this Chinese interventionist forces, and explores the military, political, and diplomatic implications of this decision, and will prove its importance in modern Chinese history, as well as the complexity thereof.

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1. Introduction

The nature of the Russian Civil War is of little dispute. As most traditional historians concur, this struggle was one between the newborn Soviet government and the remnants of the tsarist regime, one that would define the future characteristics of the Russian state, and one that best illustrates the concept of class struggle, with the ultimate victory of the Bolsheviks a sign of proletariat awakening. Indeed, the leadership of the War itself proclaimed that the intention of this armed struggle was “dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry [and] confiscation of the landed estates,”¹ as well as the destruction of “the bourgeoisie, the landowners and capitalists.” These statements suggest a predominantly domestic perspective that stressed first and foremost the liquidation of native oppositionist forces instead of confronting a hostile world of imperialists and other foes. Even so, it would be unfair to say that the new Soviets were in any way self-contained, especially when one takes into consideration their self-perceived image as leaders of a world revolution. Other than that, even before political consolidation the Bolsheviks had already begun their diplomatic affairs. The infamous Brest-Litovsk agreement in 1918; assistance were given to revolutionaries in Azerbaijan and Hungary; a strategic focus was heavily placed on the Poles in 1920.² However, the international and cosmopolitan nature of the Civil War cannot be comprehended in its entirety without a discussion of the Far East theatre, where as many as 125,000 allied soldiers crossed the Russian border to aid the pro-tsarist forces.³ Furthermore, the paramount service the Russian Civil War contributed to the Asian geopolitics is that it created a temporary but powerful *vacuum*, a period of near absolute anarchy, providing the precious and rare opportunity to entirely re-structure the diplomatic, military, and social relationships in that area. Therefore, it is arguable that the years 1918-1922 laid the basis for policies in Russia, China, and Japan concerning any of the other two in the following decades, an area of discourse hardly brought to light.

This paper thus seeks to “fill in the gap” on the Chinese side, to study its involvement in the Allied intervention of the Russian Civil War, first by presenting a detailed timeline and description of the Chinese interventionist forces in Russia, including their composition, strategy, plans and fighting records, by incorporating all available primary and secondary sources including certain official correspondence of the Chinese government that was never looked at in depth. Then, this paper argues that the Chinese decision to join the allied armies was not made under pressure from Imperial Japan, as some observers tend to believe, but a purely proactive one that indicated a deliberate program and pre-consideration. It will further assert that the Chinese intervention from the very beginning was not meant to be of a military nature, but a political one determined to increase its geopolitical prowess and influence. Therefore, this paper wishes to counter a more conventional historical approach of viewing the early Republic of China as a government with weak leaders, inconsistent political agenda, and a lack of total control over its own sovereignty⁴, but to establish its continuity in policies and their execution thereof.

2. Historiography

While the international intervention is a topic well addressed by the academia, the emphasis was nonetheless placed on the European front, and whatever research on the Far East front was dominated by

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works, Volume 26*, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov and George Hanna, ed. George Hanna (Moscow: Progressive Publishers, 1964), 31. Digitally reprinted in 2011.

² Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 69-70.

³ For example, see Benjamin Isitt, “Siberian intervention,” *The Encyclopedia of War* (Blackwell Publishing, 2011).

⁴ For example, see Chaoguang Wang, “Historical Studies on the Republic of China in the Past 50 Years,” *Modern History* 5 (1999): 157-177. 汪朝光, “50年来的中华民国史研究,” 《近代史研究》第5期。

discourse about the British, the American, or the Japanese policies and military operations, especially the last,⁵ described either as a “principal means by which British interventionists sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks”⁶ or a decisive power “far larger than expected”, which was capable of the position of leadership in the US-Japan joint expedition into Vladivostok.⁷ On the other hand, the Chinese actors were of significantly less concern and received only marginal attention and a monologic interpretation, from historians of the West as a prize Japan sought to seize by intervening in Russian Siberia,⁸ a passive polity whose limited role in the interventionist movements was nothing more than a preparation ground for the coalition of troops, a victim of imperialism.

With obvious causes, the Chinese scholars tended to look into the topic with greater enthusiasm, yet their attitudes usually assume two polarizing points of view. The first is prominent among the nationalist historians, who are not the least hesitant in concurring with the international majority by claiming China’s humiliating weakness in maintaining national sovereignty and independence, that Peking’s decision-making process ultimately rested in the hands of the Japanese, who “thus acquired the excuse of entering Chinese territories at will, exploiting Chinese military resources, and forcing the Chinese government to offer whatever assistance when deemed necessary.”⁹ The others took a somewhat more sober, if less radical, revisionist analysis, refusing to view the republican China as a puppet state. Instead, to them the WWI period, of which the Allied intervention is placed, as the first time in modern China when it began to actively pursue a foreign policy of its own. To them the interventionist decision was made deliberately to create the image of a strong centralized state, to assume the responsibility of a sovereign nation by militarily protecting its citizens abroad,¹⁰ to “fight for an upper hand in diplomatic relationships with foreign countries and a better international standing,”¹¹ and to regain control of the lost territories along its Northeast frontier.

This paper finds the second theory more persuasive, yet denies the general methods used in reaching this conclusion, for many of these observers entirely based their rationalization on a political cause. Some, by doing so, attempt to proclaim a more ancient and justifiable pedigree of a powerful Chinese government, which naturally strengthens the legitimacy of the current communist regime under which these studies are published. A minority on this question glorifies the early Republic of China, on the contrary, to denounce the perceived diplomatic vulnerability of the communists, whom they accused for being soft, compromising, even treasonous. Both are therefore biased and call for further evidential support, which this paper will wish to provide.

⁵ For example, see Evan Mawdsley, “International Responses to the Russian Civil War (Russian Empire,” *International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (Online Version), accessed through https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/international_responses_to_the_russian_civil_war_russian_empire.

⁶ Michael Jabara Carley, “Review: Allied Intervention and the Russian Civil War, 1917-1922,” *The International History Review* 11, no. 4 (1989): 692.

⁷ See Shusuke Takahara, “America’s Withdrawal from Siberia and Japan-US Relations,” *The Japanese Journal of American Studies*, no. 24 (2013): 90.

⁸ Carley, “Review: Allied Intervention,” *The International History Review* 11, no. 4 (1989): 692.

⁹ For example, see Shujie Deng, Mei Li, Xiaoli Wu, and Jihong Su, *The Tide Turning: An Analysis of Chinese History 1910-1919* (Changchun: Jilin Media Press, 2005). 邓书杰、李梅、吴晓莉、苏继红, 《新潮涌动 (1910-1919)中国历史大事详解》吉林媒体出版社。

¹⁰ Er Xue, “1918: Chinese Military Aid to Overseas Evacuation,” *China Business News*, March 22nd, 2011. Accessed on April 19th, 2019, <http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/14200868.html>. 雪珥, “撤侨1918: 北洋政府武装护侨大撤退,” *中国经营报*。

¹¹ Zhongjun Hou, “Re-analyzing the Chinese Intervention of Siberia and its Impact on Sino-Japanese relationship,” *Journal of Historical Studies* 10 (2011). 侯中军, “北京政府出兵西伯利亚及中日交涉再研究,” 《史学月刊》。

3. A Timeline of Chinese Intervention within Context¹²

Jan 12th, 1918, Japanese battleship *Iwami* entered the port of Vladivostok.¹³

March 13th, Chinese State Department decided to send a navy vessel to Vladivostok to carry out the evacuation of Chinese residents in Russia. On 20th the cruiser *Hairong* (海容), commanded by Brig. Gen. Lin Jianzhang (林建章), was chosen for the task.

April 5th, 533 Japanese marines landed in the city of Vladivostok with 100 British sailors.¹⁴

April 16th, *Hairong* arrived at Vladivostok.



Fig. 1. *Hairong* at Vladivostok. From: Private Collection of A. Shakhman.

May, China's Ministry of Navy commissioned an officer named Wang Chongwen (王崇文) to investigate the naval defense on the Amur and Songhua along the Sino-Russian border. A committee (江防会) concerning the river defense was also set up in Peking.¹⁵

May 16th, *Sino-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement* was signed between Japan and China at Peking. Specific terms were settled in a series of negotiations in the following months until September.¹⁶

In early July, the Chinese High Command of Amur Defense (吉黑江防筹) was established at Harbin with the mission of securing river patrol against the Russian and Japanese forces. Wang Chongwen was to be the commander in chief, with Lin Zhihan (林志翰) as his marine lieutenant.

July 18th, 661 Chinese soldiers of the Ninth Division, commanded by Song Huanzhang (宋章) left Peking for Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.

July 24th, 667 Chinese troops led by Su Bingwen (炳文) departed for Vladivostok by ship.

Aug 2nd, the Japanese cabinet announced the Declaration on Siberian Affairs.

¹² For an appreciatively lengthy account of the Allied intervention timeline, see George Stewart, *The White Armies of Russia: A Chronicle of Counter-Revolution and Allied Intervention* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933).

¹³ Tanaka Ryozo, *The march of the Japanese army at Vladivostok city*. 1919. Colored lithograph, 39 × 55 cm. Library of Congress. From: World Digital Library, <https://www.wdl.org/zh/item/18428/> (accessed April 19th, 2019).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Zhi Jin, *ROC Navy 1912-1945* (Taipei: China Times Publishing Co., 2015), 342. 金智, 《青天白日旗下民国海军的波涛起伏, 1912-1945》(时报文化)。

¹⁶ See *Collection of Sino-Japanese Treaties and Agreements* (Society of Sino-Japanese Treaties, 1932), 533-6. 《中日条约全辑》(中日条约研究会)。

Aug 3rd, Chinese president Feng Guozhang (国璋) signed an order designating Brig. Gen. Lin as the commander-in-chief of all Chinese troops and vessels in Russia. A command office was set up in the Vladivostok Chinatown, equipped with a diplomatic crew including Zhou Zhaorui (周兆瑞).

Aug 12th, additional 12,000 Japanese army was deployed to Vladivostok, Chita, and Nikolayevsk.¹⁷

By Oct 26th, at least 2,000 (Some sources say 4,000) Chinese troops had been stationed in various Russian cities and townships in Eastern Siberia. Most of them were garrisoned in Vladivostok.

December, the Chinese State Council passed the Amur Defense Act.¹⁸

By January 1919, Chinese troops had entered Ussuriysk and Blagoveshchensk, as well as other settlements along the railroads of Siberia under the official objective of protecting Chinese workers. Some sources had described the existence of Chinese militia in Siberian merchant towns by that point.¹⁹

July 21st, four vessels of the Chinese 2nd Fleet, cruisers *Jiangheng* (江亨), *Lijie* (利捷), *Lisui* (利), and *Lichuan* (利川), under the command of Lt. Col. Chen Shiyong (世英) left Shanghai with a transport named *Jingan* (靖安), which left the fleet months later as a result of Japanese opposition.

Early September, the Chinese fleet arrived at Nikolayevsk and stayed for the winter.

Feb 29th, 1920, after two months of fighting, the Soviet troops entered Nikolayevsk “after negotiations with the Japanese,” capturing the town with its Russian, Japanese, Chinese and Korean populations. Approximately 700-800 Chinese locals joined the Soviets.²⁰

Early March, ambiguous facts and notes, allegedly the Soviet commander “borrowed” two cannons and 120 shells from the Chinese fleet, and used them in the attack on the Japanese consulate at Nikolayevsk. Japanese sources claim otherwise, asserting that the Chinese ships had directly attacked the Japanese, overwhelming them with “12 machine guns.”

March 11th, remaining Japanese forces at Nikolayevsk began a counterattack, only to suffer great losses, and “the Japanese commander was killed, as were many other Japanese residents in town.”²¹

By April, all British and American interventionist forces had left Siberia.

Apr 6th, The (Soviet-backed) Far Eastern Republic (Дальневосточная Республика) was founded at Ulan-Ude by the declaration of a Verkhne-Udinsk conference.²²

Early May, Japanese reinforcement troops were reorganized into a Marine Territories Expedition Force, with a special force of 3,000 led by Capt. Jiro Tamon specifically targeting Nikolayevsk.

May 15th, the Far Eastern Republic was officially recognized by the Soviet government, and was granted permission to “handle all affairs between the Soviets and the Sino-Japanese authorities.”²³

May 22nd-25th, Chinese fleet at Nikolayevsk evacuated all remaining Chinese residents pursuant to Soviet directions. Two days after evacuation began, Soviet troops retreated from the city, burning it to the

¹⁷ Fan Li, *A Study of Japan's Policy on the "Northern Territories" Dispute* (Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2013). 李凡, 《日本“北方领土”问题政策研究》(北京:中央编译出版社)。

¹⁸ Zhi, *ROC Navy*, 342.

¹⁹ Er Xue, “1918: Chinese Military Aid to Overseas Evacuation,” *China Business News*, March 22nd, 2011. Accessed on April 19th, 2019, <http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/14200868.html>. 雪珥, “撤侨1918: 北洋政府武装护侨大撤退,” *中国经营报*。

²⁰ Wenhuan Zhang, “Telegraphs to the Foreign Ministry of China,” *Foreign Ministry Archives 03*. 32:379 - (1) (March 18th and March 29th, 1920), Academia Sinica. 张文焕电呈外交部 (1920年3月18日, 1920年3月29日) [Z]. 外交部档案 03. 32:379 - (1), 救济庙街华侨案(一), 中央研究院近代史研究所藏。

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *A Short Outline of the History of the Far Eastern Republic* (Washington D.C.: The Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, 1922), 15.

²³ Chunliang Wang, “Brief Discussion on the Relation between Japan and Soviet Union from 1918 to 1922,” *Journal of Shandong Teachers' University (Humanities and Social Sciences)* 47, no.1 (2002), 16. 王春良, “简论1918-1922年日本与苏俄的关系,” 《山东师范大学学报(人文社会科学版)》(2002年第47卷第1期)。

ground, leaving 834 Japanese soldiers, officials, and residents dead. Some sources say they were systematically massacred, despite Chinese demand that they be treated “as international laws dictate.”²⁴

June 3rd, Japanese army re-captured Nikolayevsk, and subsequently began to petition the Chinese authorities for the damages their equipment had inflicted on them. This petition, along with the following negotiations, continued until Jan 1922, when the Chinese formally apologized to the Japanese.²⁵

July 16th, negotiations took place between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic, sources indicate the Japanese scheme to control this republic, so that it could become a buffer zone between the communist regime and the Japanese sphere of influence “in Manchuria and Korea.”²⁶

Aug 20th, Japan began its disengagement in Eastern Siberia.

October, the Chinese fleet arrived at Harbin, ending the formal military engagement.

May 1921, with Japanese military support, an anti-Soviet “Amur River Provisional Government (Приамурский земский край)” was established at Vladivostok.

August 1922, a permanent Northeastern River Defense Navy was established, incorporating all existing river defense fleets, armies, patrols, and commands under a Navigation Bureau, formalizing Chinese naval presence in the Amur region.

Aug 15th, Japanese garrisons at Vladivostok began to disintegrate.

By the end of October, all Japanese troops in Siberia had left for Japan.

4. The Nature of Russian Civil War: Legal and Moral Grounds of Military Intervention

In order to determine the nature of Chinese intervention, it is necessary to discern the exact causes of its military involvement: was it a sign of servitude to the other Allied nations, a signal of awakening nationalism, or simply honoring the treaties that were binding to any sovereign nation? This paper found three possible legal-moral grounds on which the decision could have been made, each indicating a different approaches used by the Chinese government to interpret the role of Russian Civil War and that of itself: 1) obligation to the Allied cause in the First World War, 2) requirement by the *Sino-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement*, and 3) responsibility to protect its citizens abroad. Arguably all three factors listed above materialized during the four years of intervention, yet their priority varied, and some of the legal and lawful grounds of Chinese (and Japanese) decision-making soon would become dubious and questionable as the concept of a “civil war” , and that of a Russian one, change.

1) Allied obligations were without any doubt a factor carrying considerable weight for the Chinese. As early as August 1914, there had been waves of public support for joining the Allied cause among the learned and the opposition parties in the Chinese Congress, many of whom began to materialize their arguments in a more moral and legal point of view, replacing the initial utilitarian interpretation that “since Japan had joined the Allies, so if we do not do the same, it would then have very good cause to claim Qingdao (a German leased territory in Shandong).”²⁷ This newer attitude is best embodied by the article by the famous scholar Qichao Liang in early 1917, in which he fervently argues:

“The lately announced German scheme of submarine warfare was in essence an intolerable violation of the international law and a great threat to all of mankind,

²⁴ It is reported that this account was given by an American named Dale. See Hengrui Shao, “Telegraph to the Foreign Ministry of China,” *Foreign Ministry Archives* 03. 32:379 - (2) (July 10th, 1920), Academia Sinica. 邵恒璿电呈外交部 (1920年7月10日) [Z]. 外交部档案 03. 32:379 - (2), 救济庙街华侨案(二)。

²⁵ See Li Zhang, “Negotiations between China and Japan in the Nikolayevsk Incident,” *Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences)*, no. 1 (2015). 张力, “庙街事件中的中日交涉,” *南京大学学报 (哲学·人文科学·社会科学)* 2005年第一期。

²⁶ Chunliang, “Brief Discussion,” 17.

²⁷ Yujian Zeng, “Conflicts between President Li, the Congress, and Premier Duan,” *Collection of Primary Sources concerning the Beiyang Warlords*, ed. Chunhe Du et al (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1981). 曾毓隽 “黎段矛盾与府院冲突,” 杜春和, 等. 《北洋军阀史料选辑(上册)》. 北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 1981.

including the neutral states, of which we China was certainly a member. Therefore, such atrocity is not to be let go, and must be destroyed.”²⁸

This was shared by many, and later became the official narrative of the republican government. A strong respect for the international order thus was discerned. Therefore, when the Allied nations, especially the United States, Britain, and Japan, decided to land troops in North Russia and Siberia in securing war success, “stiffen[ing] Russian determination to continue fighting [and] prevent[ing] the Germans from using the ice-free ports as U-boat bases”²⁹ in September 1918, China willingly obliged and carried on within its own interventionist model. However, there is evidence indeed that partially weakens this assertion. First, even before the first landing of Allied troops near Murmansk in April 1918,³⁰ the Chinese had embarked on its evacuation programme, and the military movements and occupation that were to follow did not strongly correlate to those of the Western countries, suggesting a certain degree of independence. Second, virtually no contemporary Chinese source dealt with its military operations in Russia in the context of a wider European struggle, and from hindsight, it was difficult to see any lawfulness in sustaining a former, nominal ally *after* the fulfillment of the primary goal enlisted by the Allied agreement, which was the end to an aggressive Germany. More importantly, in early 1917 the Chinese premier Qirui Duan (段祺瑞) had already confirmed with the entire Congress that “the new regime in Russia after the Revolution in October would certainly continue its struggle against the German state,”³¹ making any intervention a sabotage instead of support to the Allied objectives before the March 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty. In general, this paper concludes that despite the possibility of the Allied obligation being an overarching doctrine that justified the Chinese intervention, the specific decisions were not dictated or bound by its strict legality or responsibility.

2) The *Sino-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement*, composed of two separate documents concerning the two armies and navies respectively, was theoretically binding to the signatory nations, and has been accredited by many as the banner under which the Chinese government proceeded with its intervention, acting accordingly as a quasi-puppet state of the Japanese Empire. This narrative is not without merit, as the Beiyang Government was by all account heavily swayed, if not controlled, by the Japanese military, capital, and international diplomacy.³² However, this yoke of foreign domination was weakening in its public appeal, and soon became the source of discontent and domestic protest, which gained its momentum during the First World War. Therefore, to remain in line with Japan, however “legal” it might have been, would cost the standing presidency and congress their credibility and most likely produce a public relations crisis. Therefore, the hesitance to base its actions on such notorious a document must be expected. Moreover, even when we presume the determination of China to pursue this treaty, we will find that the language in it would not entirely support a Chinese military operation in the Russian Civil War. First, the nature of the treaty concerns the specifics when a joint military action is already in place, not when such a venture *should* take place; in other words, a Chinese military intention is to be the pre-condition for the *Agreement* to be effectual, not a result

²⁸ Qichao Liang, “Rengong’s View on the Prospects of Sino-German Relationship,” *Shun Pao*, February 13th, 1917. 梁启超, “梁任公之中德国际前途观,” *申报*, 1917年2月13日。

²⁹ Fred L. Borch III, “Bolsheviks, Polar Bears, and Military Law: The Experiences of Army Lawyers in North Russia and Siberia in World War I,” *Army Lawyers in Russia*. Accessed on April 21st, 2019, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Bolsheviks-Polar-Bears.pdf (Library of Congress).

³⁰ Steward, *The White Armies of Russia*, 85.

³¹ Juyin Tao, *A History of the Reign by Beiyang Warlords*, vol. 3 (Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1957). 陶菊隐, 《北洋军阀统治时期史话(第三册)》, 上海: 生活·读书·新知三联书店, 1957。

³² For example, see Yanqiu Wei, “An Attempt on the Early Beiyang Diplomacy of ‘Maintenance’,” *Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences*, no. 6 (2003), 50-55. 魏延秋, “试论北洋军阀政府前期的‘维持外交’,” 《南京社会科学》2003年第6期., and Bofeng Zhang, “Discussion on Several Problems in my Study of Beiyang History,” *Beiyang Warlords (1912-1928)* (Wuhan: Wuhan Press, 1990). 章伯锋, “谈谈北洋军阀史研究的几个问题,” 《北洋军阀(1912-1928)》(武汉: 武汉出版社)。

thereof. Second, the chief intention of this paper, the prompts of which were largely drafted and forced by the Japanese, was to produce a legal ground for the Imperial forces to trespass Chinese territories in Manchuria, explicitly ignoring the possibility of Chinese mobilization.³³ Third, though some observers claim that the objective of this treaty, such embodied in the opening clause, that “to engage in mutual defense so that the tranquility of the Far East may be sustained at the face of an expanding *enemy state* (国) within Russia”, one must admit its ambiguity. The term “state” further complicated the matter. If Japan and China were to validate this treaty in fighting the Bolsheviks, they would inevitably recognize the sovereign status of their foe, turning the concept of a “civil war” into an international conflict between two belligerent, independent nations. The most significant evidence is yet to come: the final clause avowedly nullifies the entire treaty at the end of “military conflict between the two signatory states and the German-Austrian alliance,” crippling the intervention after November 1918. Instead of coordination, the relationship between the Chinese and Japanese intervention forces was more of a mutual dislike, a condition that was confirmed by an American soldier in his private diary³⁴ and peaked around the Nikolayevsk Incident, when the Chinese military remained indifferent (if not hostile) to the Japanese troops, something that would not have happened had the *Agreement* been really that successful. In conclusion, the role of this *Agreement* was limited at best when China began its military planning in mid-1918, and had ceased its effects by its full-flung intervention which reached its full capacity in the first months of 1919 and persisted afterwards.

3) The evacuation model was a lately emerged explanation of Chinese intervention, and remains, as this paper sees it, the most convincing one. The multitude of telegrams and letters flooding the Foreign Ministry in Peking was astonishing in their volume and timeliness. The first hint at this solution was provided by the chief consul Shiyuan Lu (是元) at Vladivostok in a telegram sent on December 5th,³⁵ 1917, a proposition soon seconded by the Chinese merchant guilds in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.³⁶ More were to come in February 1918 when a Hengrui Shao (邵恒璿) became the chief consul, who pushed the idea with greater enthusiasm. This proposal was then “deliberately considered” by the State Department, which eventually made the decision of intervention.³⁷ The substantial time and energy invested into this potential resolution alone was enough to show the conviction of Chinese authorities. When the deployment of *Hairong* aroused Japanese suspicions and opposition, the Chinese diplomats responded by citing the “frequent requests by our nationals abroad” as a paramount justification³⁸, further attesting to this point.

Nevertheless, this narrative was only a piece of a much larger picture. Beiyang China saw civilian evacuation as an objective to be pursued, but merely as one of the means to an end. This “end”, which consists of two components, as the next two sections would examine in greater depth, was approached from all faucets political, military, intellectual and propagandic, but most of these “pipelines” were to remain

³³ See Section Three of the *Agreement*, which specifies that “within the territories on which such [joint] military operations are to be carried out, local Chinese bureaucrats must provide all due assistance to the Japanese army to prevent obstruction, while the Japanese soldiers must respect Chinese sovereignty and customs, thus avoiding as much inconvenience as possible.”

³⁴ See William C. Jones, “1918,” *Jones Siberian Diary*. Accessed on April 22nd, 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070625054134/http://nortwoods.net/trs/siberia/jonessibdiary-1.htm>. He writes about how “the Japanese troops... had made themselves offensive to Russians, Chinese, French, Czechs, Italians, and Americans.”

³⁵ Academia Sinica, *Historical Sources on Sino-Russian Relationship (The Siberian Intervention)* (Academia Sinica, 1960), 679. 《中俄关系史料·出兵西伯利亚》台湾中央研究院近代史研究所 1960年本, 第679页。

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Xiaofan Qu, “A Brief Overview of the Beiyang Government’s Protection to its Citizens Abroad in Siberia, 1918-1921,” *Historical Studies on Chinese Abroad*, no. 1 (1998), 60-65. 曲晓范, “试述1918-1921年北洋政府在西伯利亚的护侨活动,” 《华侨华人历史研究》1998年第1期, 第60-65页。

³⁸ Academia Sinica, *Historical Sources on Sino-Russian Negotiations (The Siberian Intervention)* (Academia Sinica, 1960), 60. 《中俄交涉史料·出兵西伯利亚卷》台湾中央研究院近代史研究所 1960年本, 第60页。

secrete and less doctrinally legal, which means that the “evacuation model” was consistently referred to as the only open cause of military intervention.

5. Intervention as a Symbol of Centralization and Sovereignty

The early decades of the Chinese Republic (ROC) are almost always recorded as a time of chaos and factionalism that paralyzed and sabotaged the central governments in Peking and Nanking. In fact, such fragmentation of governing power had been so outrageous that the years between 1912 and 1928 were dubbed “the Warlord Era” by James E. Sheridan,³⁹ which many claim to have consumed too much of the governmental wealth, manpower, and attention, destabilizing the Chinese state as a whole.⁴⁰ However, this clearly and unfairly one-sided view is put into question by a closer review of the Siberian intervention. The rather peculiar unity among the generals in Harbin, the high admiralty in Peking, the naval command in Shanghai, and the local supporting troops not only was a facade that showcased the seeming enhancement of the Peking regime, but also suggested some actual “common cause” that preceded the nation’s centripetal process in the early 1930s.

The “facade” theory was only too obvious. Simply by providing troops to join the Allied intervention would present the image of a nation capable of military organization, movement, supplies, and coordination. The “Song Battalion”, as the Chinese interventionist forces were to be called, was a carefully selected group formerly affiliated to the precious German-trained “Model Battalions” under Shikai Yuan (袁世凯), naturally conveying the powerful message of national prestige and prowess. Thus, the Chinese intervention was more of a parade than a battle-oriented mission, a belief supported by the lack of records of actual Chinese fighting history. Furthermore, the intervention was undertaken in a time of national crisis, when the naval resources of Peking were near depletion and its armies preoccupied by warfare and rebellions in the Southwest,⁴¹ making the removal of any vessel or army unit from its interior fronts potentially dangerous. When a nation attempts some policy within its grasp, we may with confidence say that such plans are meant for some realistically discernible actual goals, but when a one strains its resources to carry out a programme, it must be either a matter of grave importance or an action for show and deception designed to minimize the actual weakness. Since the Siberian affairs had never even deteriorated to a tangible threat, the latter explained the situation better. Indeed, the intent of civilian evacuations was clearly linked to the idea of national sovereignty,⁴² in that only a recognized polity, with its own territorial borders and administrative authorities would be legitimate in asserting its jurisdiction over the nationals abroad in accordance to the Westphalian tradition.

Some may argue that this adherence to international law was unnecessary, and a rarity within the international community during that time, as “the justness of the cause... was of little practical value... not regulated by by international law” around the transitional years of the 1890s, 1900s, and 1910s.⁴³ Therefore, naturally the most pragmatic solution was that of neglect, which might save the government from confrontations with its geographical neighbors in an effort to achieve something that would bring no immediate profit whatsoever. This, however, can be explained if we look at the thread that ties together the

³⁹ James E. Sheridan, “The warlord era: politics and militarism under the Peking government, 1916-28,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 12: 284-321.

⁴⁰ For example, see Mingde Wang, “Geopolitical Relationships among the Beiyang Warlords,” *Jiangxi Social Sciences*, no. 2 (2002), 80-84, 118. 王明德, “北洋政府时期军阀间的地缘关系及其影响,” 《江西社会科学》2002年第2期。

⁴¹ This crisis was known as the First Constitutional Protection Movement (第一次护法战争), a struggle between Sun Yet-sun (孙中山) and the Premier Qirui Duan, whose arbitration suspension of the *Chinese Provisional Constitution* (临时约法) was the main cause of hostilities.

⁴² See Andrew W. R. Thomson, “Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad: Rise of the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation,” *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 11, no. 3 (2012), 628-668.

⁴³ See *Ibid*, 630 and Sir Humphrey Waldock, *The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law*, 81 RECEUIL DES COURS *supra* note 5, at 457.

entire diplomatic history of the Chinese republic, which is to become a true member of the global society, to cast aside the humiliating reputation as a East Asian weakling it had been wearing since the late Qing dynasty. To secure this end, the Chinese government has come to the conclusion that only by self-assimilating into the law-abiding fashion of an ideal sovereign state can it earn the perception as a civilized people. This peculiar mentality contributed to a tendency of following suit and an almost rigid, inflexible foreign policy. For instance, the December 1917 message from Vladivostok mentioned earlier explicitly asked Peking to “do what Washington and Tokyo did” on the matter of evacuation,⁴⁴ and the ambassador to Japan at the time, Zongxiang Zhang (章宗祥) relied on the other Allied military movements as inviolable precedents to a similar Chinese project.⁴⁵

Now that the facade perspective might have created an undesirable glaze of deception, it must be said that the Siberian intervention still shed some light of the actual unity and consensus within a fractured country after the collapse of its many dynasties. This is first and foremost exemplified by the chain of command this evacuation suggestion went through: the consuls abroad were directly appointed by and answer to the central government’s Foreign Ministry, but the State Council had its first related telegram sent to the Army Inspector of Jilin (吉林督), a Feng Warlord, whose leader Zuolin Zhang (张作霖) was constantly at odds with the Zhi-Huan Faction that dominated Peking.⁴⁶ This trust was then reciprocated when the Fengs secured the Amur border region with “massive forces” and began to organize civilian transport trains into Russian territories until the arrival of the official evacuation fleet.⁴⁷ The naval operations showed even greater cooperation and some altruistic behavior on a governmental level. The Admiralty’s orders were duly noted by the Shanghai fleet, whose commanders willingly sent four vessels to the North to join the Amur Defense scheme essentially controlled by the Feng warlords, while the latter devoted this reinforced fleet not into the conventional conflicts against the Peking adversaries, but chose to follow the orders from the capital in capturing Russian river ports at their own expense. This collaboration among *de facto* independent governors suggests to us an emerging trend of Chinese nationalism, a belief that China would be a state of provinces instead of a state of nations. In other words, this intervention opened up a new path to the domestic politics in China at the time: that the division among warlords was of a purely and only political nature, not an ideological or “national” one. Therefore, it was never as irreconcilable as some suggest, but something readily fixable at the face of an external intrusion.

6. Intervention as an Attempt to Reform Geo-political Dilemmas

The most vital implication of China’s Siberian intervention was not domestic, but international, but was still based on the former. In the execution of a military action and the unification of local interests, Peking sought to “right the wrongs” of the colonial age, and reinvent the Far Eastern geopolitical circumstance to its very own favor. This aspect of intervention is hinted at by the little literature on this subject, but most stopped at commenting that “[the intervention] portrayed a rising power”⁴⁸ or that it “won China international renowns”⁴⁹ without further investigation. This paper identifies four specific geopolitical goals China intended to meet by sending troops into Russia, all interconnected into formulating a pondered plan to reassert its authority over Manchuria and to break free from its powerful neighbors to the North and East.

1) Remilitarization of the Amur Basin. This was by all means the most immediate benefit of intervention. Heavily contested between the Russian Empire and the Qing Empire, the Amur watershed was

⁴⁴ Academia Sinica, *Historical Sources*, 679. 《中俄关系史料·出兵西伯利亚》第679页。

⁴⁵ Academia Sinica, *Historical Sources*, 60. 《中俄交涉史料·出兵西伯利亚卷》第60页。

⁴⁶ Xiaofan Qu, “A Brief Overview,” 60. 曲晓范, 第60页。

⁴⁷ Er Xue, “1918: Chinese Military Aid”. 雪珥, “撤侨1918: 北洋政府武装护侨大撤退,” *中国经营报*。

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Xiaofan, “A Brief Overview,” 65. 曲晓范, 第65页。

seen as a crucial strategic area. Since the Treaties of Aigun and Peking in mid-19th century, China “was cut off from the sea north of Korea, and from the entire Amur River below its confluence with the Ussuri,”⁵⁰ a discontent that soured the Sino-Russian relationship for more than half a century.⁵¹ The remilitarization of the Amur River by the Chinese was the most essential step in securing the Northeastern frontier of the country, and the river basin was to be the first line of defense for this region rich with oil, black soil, and industrial bases. Exploiting the justification of self-defense, China not only enhanced its naval presence in Manchuria, but also smoothened the chain of command from Peking to Harbin, ensuring that the military resources there could be mobilized with more efficiency in case of any emergency.

The intervention was also a precious opportunity for both the army and the navy to gain real-life experience in a scenario they had never encountered before. The refurbishing of merchant ships into combatant vessels was promoted,⁵² the recruitment of a marine force was begun in 1919,⁵³ and the establishment of a command office specifically designed to carry out coastal defense all were signs of heightened vigilance and diversification. Furthermore, the intervention allowed the Chinese military to practice interservice combats, improve the transportation and communication systems along the borderline,⁵⁴ gain more intelligence on the Russian and Japanese military and administrative tactics,⁵⁵ and rejuvenate the confidence local officials and public would place on the army, a factor that would prove crucial in any armed conflict. All these measures were geared towards one single goal, to incorporate the Northeastern frontier into the defensive and military system of China, to regain the lost military presence in Manchuria, and to deter a possible Russian offensive across the Amur river, a threat dreaded by the local Chinese bureaucrats since the first territorial concessions and lost battles in the 1850s.

2) Acquisition of the Chinese Northeastern Railroad (中 路) was also anticipated by many. This artery of Manchurian transportation, first constructed by Russian in 1896, had been a vital section of the “strategic railroad network” of tsarist Russia intended to “permanentize its sphere of influence in the Far East.”⁵⁶ In order to fulfill its military destiny, the railroad passed through key locations in Chinese Northeast including Harbin, Shenyang, Changchun and Lvshun, penetrating the entire interior of Manchuria, connecting the Siberian natural resources to the warm water port of China. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan acquired the Southern extensions of this network, posing a constant threat to the region. The importance of this railroad web cannot be exaggerated. Therefore, since the Russian Revolution first broke out in 1917 and throughout the Civil War when the Russian control of the Railroad significantly weakened, China began to move into the management of it, using it for military and specifically interventionist purposes. For example,

⁵⁰ Neville Maxwell, “How the Sino-Russian Boundary Conflict was Finally Settled: From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969,” *Critical Asian Studies* 39, no. 2 (2007), 232.

⁵¹ For example, see Yuexin Rachel Lin, “White water, Red tide: Sino-Russian conflict on the Amur 1917-20,” *Historical Research* 90, no. 247 (2017), 76-100.

⁵² For example, in April 1920, the Amur Defense Command purchased three merchant vessels for military remodeling, named *Jiangping* (江平), *Jiang-an* (江安), and *Jiangtong* (江通). See Zhi, *ROC Navy*, 343.

⁵³ Jianzhong Sun, *The Development of ROC Marines* (Taipei: Office of Translation and Compilation, Department of Defense, 2010), 34. 孙建中, 《中华民国海军陆战队发展史》(台北: 国防部史政编译室, 民国99年), 第34页。

⁵⁴ Chinese correspondence at the time discussed the questions of an Amur civilian fleet, the use of railroad as a method of military transportation, and the various methods of relaying information across the border.

⁵⁵ For example, see “Reception of a Message from the Revenue & Customs Office,” *Historical Sources on Sino-Russian Relationship (The Defense of Northeast and Outer Mongolia)* (Academia Sinica), 36-40. “收节译总税务司安格联上会办函”, 收录于《中俄关系史料·东北边防与外蒙(中华民国十年)》(中央研究院近代史研究所)第36-40页。This telegram in April 1920 has a translation of all Russian signals and maritime notifications on the Amur River, as well as a specific translation of an order received by the Russian-controlled Vladivostok Battery. Such translations of documents ranging from army notices to trivial technical matters can be found in abundance.

⁵⁶ Yuebiao Xu, “Russian Investment in China and the Finance of its Northeastern Railroad,” *Modern Chinese History Studies* no. 2 (1994), 127-8. 徐曰彪, “试论俄国在华投资与东省铁路财政,” 《近代史研究》1994年第2期。

after a group of Bolshevik railway workers in Harbin took up arms against the Imperial supervisors in March 1917, the Chinese governor Zongxi Guo (郭宗熙) declared martial law and sent in troops under disguise to maintain “law and order”. By December, sixteen battalions had been deployed and four more mobilized.⁵⁷ Relying upon the Allied intervention as an obligation to be honored, the Chinese authorities soon planned to turn a temporary suppression and policing works into a permanent transition of proprietorship. On December 17th, the British ambassador, on behalf of the United States, France and other Allies, pressed the Chinese government for a crackdown of the “Harbin Bolsheviks” as a part of the intervention,⁵⁸ and acting under this cause, China enacted an ordinance on the same day, legitimizing “the militarization of the railroad by the Chinese troops,” creating the offices of a railroad supervisor, a military superintendent of the railroad, and a railroad councillor so that the *de facto* ownership had been placed in Chinese hands.⁵⁹ This swift and forceful showcase of military might was precisely timed when neither side in the Russian Civil War was powerful or secure enough to run the railroad, when the Japanese were not sufficiently prepared to cause additional troubles, and when the European powers still retained positive confidence in the general intervention programme. The Chinese occupation lasted until the spring of 1920, after whose withdrawal the Soviets conceded multiple extraterritorial rights back to the Chinese, such as those of defense, settlement, municipal management, and navigation, putting an end to “the monopoly they enjoyed along the roads in Northern Manchuria.”⁶⁰

3) Military preparations for a Japanese invasion were by all accounts a paramount objective above all constraints of treaties, international laws and pragmatic alliances. Compared to the Russian Empire, the Imperial forces of Japan had been a more visible and hated archenemy of the Chinese Empire and its successor state. Therefore, in order to prevent intrusion, China pursued a twofold goal in intervening in the Russian Civil War: to secure its own Northeastern frontier, and to see that Japan would not control the Russian ports along the Sea of Japan coastline, which would enable the development of a prosperous sea basin comparable to the Mediterranean, where troops can be easily deployed using ships.⁶¹ The former was accomplished by the aforementioned Amur Defense, while the latter was done by the increase of naval transports on the Sea of Japan and garrisons in coastal cities of Russia. The militarization of the local railways can also be seen as the buildup of an equal force against the Japanese “Road Guards” located at the several stations and towns along the South Manchurian Railroad, which would become the chief invading army in the first months of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1931, after being regrouped and reinforced into the infamous Kwantung Army.

4) Replacement of Japan as a regional arbitrator was the diplomatic side of the deterrent of open war. Since the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Japan had emerged as the industrial model and the primary colonial power in East Asia, a position that became almost indisputable after its victory over Russia in 1904-5. This post can be seen as a “regional police”, a state capable of maintaining equilibrium in the Far East, powerful enough to force the other Asian nations into compliance but not powerful enough to disrupt the Euro-American order. China pursued this end from two approaches. First, the responsibility of suppressing the railroad workers’ revolt was quickly assumed by the Chinese bureaucrats who expressly warned about a

⁵⁷ Nianxuan Li, “The Harbin Incident and the Chinese Northeastern Railroad,” *Collection of Modern Chinese History Studies*, no. 9 (1980), 347-384. 李念萱, “「哈乱」与中东铁路,” 《近代史研究所集刊》1980年第9期, 347-384页。

⁵⁸ Academia Sinica, *Historical Sources on Sino-Russian Negotiations (Russian Revolution and Related Negotiations)*, 6: Section 1917, Document #15. 《中俄交涉史料·俄政变与一般交涉》民六年, 第十五号文, 页六。

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 11-12: Document #31. 《中俄交涉史料》民六年, 第三十一号文。

⁶⁰ Nianxuan, “The Harbin Incident”, 381.

⁶¹ For a more specific account on the Japanese plan regarding the Russian, Korean, and Manchurian coastline, see Chi Fei, “The Opening up of Yanbian in Early 20th Century and the Changes in Northeast Asia Politics,” *Dongjiang Journal* (2010). 费驰, “20世纪初延边地区开埠与东北亚政治格局的变化,” 《东疆学刊》(2010年)。

Japanese takeover if China acted with reluctance.⁶² This was a gesture to the Western diplomatic crews that China was willing and able to take its international duties in place of Japan, and the urgency with which the latter petitioned to send in soldiers⁶³ suggests the mutual understanding that a competition was underway between the two countries. On the other hand, the actual use of Chinese military forces in Russia, understandably perceived as a contest for leadership in the intervention, was resisted by Japan as a disruption to its scheme, embodied by the *Mutual Defense Agreement*, of placing China within its grip.⁶⁴ Only with American and French consent did Japan back down. In hindsight, it is easy to make the conclusion that this transition of power had miserably failed, since China was again invaded and overrun by Japan in the Second World War; however, at the time many did believe in the impending success of this ambition, as the Chinese delegation cheerfully marched into the Paris Peace Conference convinced that its “active diplomacy” and labor in the Allied intervention would guarantee reparations, returns of German colonies in Shandong, and international recognition.⁶⁵

7. Russian Response to Chinese Intervention

On the Russian side, the most peculiar reactions took place, in that the Soviet regime, the intended foe of the Chinese state, viewed the Chinese with less hostility than the White forces did. The Chinese interventionist armies were of little impression to the Soviets, and aroused little popular discontent or hatred on a national level. Few Soviet sources mentioned China as an “imperialistic” nation, and even the populist, propaganda posters placed little attention on China as they did on Japan or England.



⁶² *Historical Sources (Russian Revolution)*, 19-20, Document #47. 《中俄交涉史料》民六年, 第四十七号文, 页六.

⁶³ In December, 1917, the telegram from the Railroad Command to the Governor of Jilin says that “The Japanese had been thinking of military suppression on the ground of protecting its commercial interests [along the railroad]. It has also claimed that due to our hesitancy in involvement, Japan... would have to send in the first troops.” *Ibid*.

⁶⁴ Er Xue, “1918: Chinese Military Aid”. 雪珥, “撤侨1918: 北洋政府武装护侨大撤退,” *中国经营报*.

⁶⁵ For example, see Zhongjun Hou, “Studies on China within the Context of WWI since 1949,” *Lanzhou Xuekan* (2015), 1-9. 侯中军, “1949年以来的中国与一战外交研究,” 《兰州学刊》(2015年6月).

Fig. 2. *The Liquidation of Kolchak and His Follower, September 1919-1922.*⁶⁶ The interventionist nations are painted in a metallic greenish tone, while the “neutral” states are in grey. China is categorized into the latter, and is not even labeled as one of the forces that participated in the invasion of Vladivostok. On the contrary, the Whites and other anti-Soviet Russians (or Ukrainians, in some cases) portrayed the Chinese as a brutal, uncivilized people secretly aiding the Soviet cause.



Fig. 3. *Peace and Freedom Together (Caricature of Trotsky and prikaz Odessa).*⁶⁷ This unflattering depiction of the Chinese soldiers was both a racial and a political statement.

These contradictory attitudes may not be entirely due to the activities (or inactivity) of the Chinese *interventionist* forces, but rather the high rates of Chinese workers participating in the Revolution on the Soviet side, as well as the century-long mutual racism between Imperial Russia and Qing China. The former factor has been the subject of many recent researches, and has established that the Chinese Soviet soldiers, many of whom joined voluntarily, earned the reputation of being ruthless, cruel, unsympathetic, “without moral burden after shooting priests or high Imperial bureaucrats.”⁶⁸ The foreignness of the Chinese troops may have also aroused the Slavophile hatred of the Imperial subjects, while the Soviets would have been more

⁶⁶ A. A. Baranov, *The liquidation of Kolchak and his follower // September 1919 - 1922*. Colored lithographic print, 64 × 101 cm. Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division, compiled by A. N. de-Lazari and N. N. Lesevitskii. From: <https://www.loc.gov/tr/geogmap/pdf/ruscw/ruscwmaps.html>.

⁶⁷ Izd. Odesskogo Otdela Propogandy, *Peace and Freedom Together (Caricature of Trotsky and prikaz Odessa)*. Chromolithograph, 80 × 56 cm. The New York Public Library, Harold M. Fleming papers. Accessed on April 26th, 2019 from: <https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-4044-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>.

⁶⁸ “A Century since the Russian Revolution: The Chinese who captured the Winter Palace,” *BBC News*, November 20th, 2017. Accessed on April 26th, 2019 from <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-42003768>.

tolerant to the other nationalities, as Lenin himself had promoted in ideology and policy.⁶⁹ This paradox created chaos and incoherence in the Soviet dealing with the Chinese: Lenin sent personal telegrams to the revolutionary workers at the Harbin Railroad Office to support their taking over sovereignty from the Imperial officers while resisting the Chinese seizure⁷⁰ and accused the Peking government of “being the puppet of Western bankers”⁷¹ when the local Soviet commissars reached out to the intervening Chinese for help in the Nikolayevsk Incident. This also offered insight to the decentralized nature of the newborn Bolshevik regime, as the Petrograd Soviet, despite its justifiable opposition to the Chinese state, failed to convey this message to its regional and provincial branches, whose behavior was largely dictated by needs instead of belief.

8. Conclusion

After reviewing all the materials, the nature of this Chinese intervention is clear, that it was a half military, half civilian movement designated to show its stature as an independent state with a powerful centralized governmental structure and a strong armed force, to convince the Western world that it was capable of ensuring regional peace and assuming more international obligations than they had presumed, and to exploit the intervention as a justified cause to better incorporate the Chinese Northeast (a locale with long traditions of quasi-autonomy) into the Chinese political and military network as a bulwark against Russian and Japanese expansion. These complex demands thus gave birth to the three most outstanding characteristics this operation possesses: 1) that it lacked a clear agenda or target, fighting the Japanese more than the Whites, 2) that it was limited in scale both geographically and chronologically, as China must be conservative in its foreign policy execution to avoid offending the interests of Western powers, and 3) that it was justified both legally and morally, but these legitimizing factors were of little actual value to the programme once initiated. In conclusion, the Chinese intervention was a vital moment in its modern history, an experimental war of propaganda and an attempt to earn respect, and was unfairly neglected and minimized by historians. This paper gave a preliminary overview of the topic and suggested some possible avenues through which future researches can be conducted.

⁶⁹ For example, see Beryl Williams, “Lenin and the Problem of Nationalities,” *History of European Ideas* 15, no. 4-6 (1992), 611-617, and R. Vaidyanath, “Lenin on National Minorities,” *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 27, no. 1 (1971), 28-39.

⁷⁰ Nianxuan, “The Harbin Incident”.

⁷¹ Jiagu Li, “Early Sino-Russian Relationship after the Russian Revolution,” *21st Century* 27, no. 6 (2004). 李嘉谷, “十月革命后的早期中苏关系,” 《二十一世纪》网络版 二零零四年六月号, 总第二十七期。